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Abstract
This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are for-
mulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, ﬁxed-
population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-proﬁle setting with ﬁxed prob-
abilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation prob-
lems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain
alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D71, D81.
Keywords: Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem, multi-proﬁle social choice, population
ethics.
1. Introduction
Harsanyi’s [1955, 1977] social aggregation theorem establishes that if individuals and so-
ciety are endowed with von Neumann – Morgenstern (vNM) functions (von Neumann
and Morgenstern [1944, 1947]) deﬁned on the set of lotteries over alternatives and the
Pareto-indiﬀerence axiom formulated for lotteries is satisﬁed, then, under some regular-
ity assumptions, the social vNM function can be written as an aﬃne combination of the
individual vNM functions. If, as Harsanyi assumes, there are individual vNM functions
that measure actual (ex-post) utility, utilitarianism results. This result has been dis-
cussed extensively in the literature and variants of it have been established in a number
of contributions; see, for example, Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [1980, 1999, 2003],
Broome [1990, 1991], Coulhon and Mongin [1989], De Meyer and Mongin [1995], Domotor
[1979], Fishburn [1984], Hammond [1981, 1983], Mongin [1994, 1995, 1998], Mongin and
d’Aspremont [1998], Weymark [1991, 1993, 1994, 1995] and Zhou [1997]. An elegant proof
due to Border [1981] is reproduced in expanded form in Weymark [1994].
Most of the literature focuses on the social ranking of lotteries. In this paper, however,
we employ an alternative model in which probabilities are ﬁxed but utility proﬁles are
allowed to vary. In that case, prospects (vectors of alternatives, one for each of the possible
states) rather than lotteries are ranked. An important feature of our approach is that it
operates in a framework with multiple utility proﬁles.1 This formulation, which follows
the multi-proﬁle of much of the traditional social-choice literature, allows us to proceed
without the regularity conditions that are required in the lottery approach and permits the
use of standard anonymity axioms. We prove our main theorems for a ﬁxed probability
distribution which is common to all individuals and the social evaluator. However, the
results continue to apply if the probability distribution may vary, as long as probabilities
are objectively known or agreed upon by all individuals and society.
We establish new variants of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem. First, we gener-
alize a ﬁxed-population result due to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002] by showing
that its conclusion is valid under weaker assumptions: in particular, the minimal number
of alternatives required can be reduced from four to three. The resulting characterization
is a reformulation of a result due to Mongin [1994].2 Second, we extend the model to
variable-population comparisons. This generalization involves substantial additional com-
plexities because the composition and the size of the population may vary across states.
Thus, individuals may be alive in some states but not in others. We take the view that
ex-ante assessment of prospects are meaningless if an individual is not alive in all possible
1 Multi-proﬁle models of social choice under uncertainty are also discussed, for example, in Black-
orby, Donaldson and Weymark [1999, 2003], Hammond [1981, 1983], Mongin [1994] and Mongin and
d’Aspremont [1998].
2 Mongin [1994] uses a diﬀerent domain assumption for some of his results.
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states. As a consequence, we formulate all axioms that are concerned with individual ex-
ante utilities so that they apply to complete prospects only—prospects where each person
who is alive in one state is alive in all states.
Two classes of variable-population extensions of ex-ante utilitarianism are character-
ized. To do this, we employ axioms which ensure that, for every incomplete prospect, there
is a complete prospect that is equally good. In addition, we discuss the generalization of
our results to a setting in which both prospects and probabilities may vary.
The proof technique employed in the multi-proﬁle ﬁxed-population case is diﬀerent
from those that appear in the lottery framework. However, the most novel part of the paper
is the variable-population extension: the consideration of population problems introduces
substantial additional complexities.
The ﬁxed-population model of social evaluation under uncertainty formulated in terms
of prospects is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 contains a characterization of ex-ante
utilitarianism and an impossibility result. Two classes of variable-population extensions of
ex-ante utilitarianism are characterized in Section 4. Section 5 provides a generalization
to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions
and prospects. Section 6 concludes.
2. Ex-ante social evaluation with a ﬁxed population
There are several ways of incorporating uncertainty into a model of social evaluation. Al-
though much of the relevant literature—including Harsanyi’s [1955] original contribution—
focuses on the social ranking of lotteries (probability distributions deﬁned on the set of
possible alternatives), we use a formulation in terms of prospects instead because it al-
lows for a more natural extension of standard multi-proﬁle social evaluation to situations
involving uncertainty. In order to prove our theorems, it is not necessary to allow the
probabilities to vary.
We use Z++ to denote the set of positive integers. R is the set of all real numbers,
R++ is the set of all positive real numbers and, for n ∈ Z++ and an arbitrary set S, Sn
is the n-fold Cartesian product of S. 1n is the vector consisting of n ∈ Z++ ones.
In the ﬁxed-population case, there are n ∈ Z++ individuals labelled 1, . . . , n. Thus,
the set of individuals is N = {1, . . . , n}. The universal set of alternatives is X and, in
order to ensure that the standard welfarism results apply, we assume that X contains at
least three elements.
Suppose there is a setM = {1, . . . , m} of possible states, where m ≥ 2, and an associ-
ated vector of ﬁxed positive probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Rm++ where, by deﬁnition of a
probability distribution,
∑m
j=1 pj = 1. Because probabilities are assumed to be ﬁxed, any
state with a probability of zero may be dropped and, therefore, the positivity requirement
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on p involves no loss of generality as long as there are at least two states with positive
probabilities. A prospect is a vector x ∈ Xm where, for all j ∈ M , xj is the alternative
that materializes in state j. We use X to denote the set of all prospects, that is, X = Xm.
For x ∈ X, the prospect x1m, deﬁned as (x, . . . , x) ∈ X, is one in which the alternative x
occurs with certainty (that is, x is realized in all possible states).
For each individual i ∈ N , Ui:X →R is i’s actual or ex-post utility function. That is,
Ui(x) measures i’s well-being in alternative x ∈ X. An ex-post utility proﬁle is an n-tuple
U = (U1, . . . , Un), and the set of all possible proﬁles is U . For an alternative x ∈ X, we
let U(x) = (U1(x), . . . , Un(x)).
Individual i’s ex-ante utility function is UEAi :X→ R, that is, UEAi (x) is the value of
the prospect x ∈ X to individual i ∈ N . A proﬁle of ex-ante utility functions is an n-tuple
UEA = (UEA1 , . . . , U
EA
n ), and the set of all possible ex-ante proﬁles is UEA. For x ∈ X,
we let UEA(x) = (UEA1 (x), . . . , U
EA
n (x)). Note that, in contrast to ex-post utilities that
assign an individual value to each alternative in X, ex-ante utility functions assign a value
to each prospect in X.
Throughout, we assume that ex-ante and ex-post utilities satisfy the fundamental
consistency requirement that their assessments of certain outcomes are identical: if an
alternative materializes in every possible state, ex-ante utility coincides with ex-post utility.
That is, for all i ∈ N and for all x ∈ X,
UEAi (x1m) = Ui(x). (1)
(1) implies that the ex-ante utility function UEAi determines the ex-post utility function
Ui, although the converse is not true.
To deﬁne an ex-ante criterion for social evaluation, we use the following terminology.
An ex-ante ordering is an ordering deﬁned on the set of prospects X, and the set of all
ex-ante orderings on X is denoted by OEA. An ex-ante social-evaluation functional is a
mapping FEA:DEA → OEA with ∅ = DEA ⊆ UEA. FEA assigns a social ordering on
X to each proﬁle of ex-ante utility functions in its domain DEA. We use the notation
REA
UEA
= FEA(UEA) for all UEA ∈ DEA. PEA
UEA
and IEA
UEA
denote the asymmetric and
symmetric factors of REA
UEA
.
For an individual i ∈ N , a von Neumann – Morgenstern (vNM) function is a mapping
UvNMi :X → R. A vNM proﬁle is an n-tuple UvNM = (UvNM1 , . . . , UvNMn ) ∈ U . Note
that, without further assumptions, vNM functions do not necessarily measure individual
well-being and, conversely, ex-post utility functions can not necessarily be employed as
vNM functions.
The individual expected-utility hypothesis requires that the individual ex-ante rank-
ing of any two prospects x and y is determined by the expected values of i’s vNM func-
tion obtained for x and y, given the probability vector p. In our multi-proﬁle approach,
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we require the ex-ante social-evaluation functional to be consistent with the individual
expected-utility hypothesis in the sense that it produces a social ordering for each utility
proﬁle that is composed of individual ex-ante utilities satisfying the hypothesis. Thus,
expected-utility consistency is formulated as a domain assumption. The expected-utility
domain DEU ⊆ UEA is deﬁned as follows. For all UEA ∈ UEA, UEA ∈ DEU if and only
if there exists a proﬁle UvNM ∈ U of vNM functions such that, for all i ∈ N and for all
x,y ∈ X,
UEAi (x) ≥ UEAi (y)⇔
m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
i
(
xj
) ≥ m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
i
(
yj
)
.
Clearly, this requirement is satisﬁed if and only if there exists an increasing function
ϕi:R → R such that, for all i ∈ N and for all x ∈ X,
UEAi (x) = ϕi
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
i
(
xj
))
. (2)
Equation (1) implies that Ui(x) = ϕi ◦ UvNMi . If the social-evaluation functional is re-
quired to generate a social ordering for all proﬁles such that the individual ex-ante utilities
are required to satisfy the expected-utility hypothesis, we obtain the following domain
assumption.
Individual Expected-Utility Consistency: DEA = DEU .
The Bernoulli hypothesis (see Arrow [1972] and Broome [1991]) imposes a more strin-
gent restriction on individual ex-ante utilities than the expected-utility hypothesis: it re-
quires that the function ϕi in (2) is aﬃne. Because, by assumption, an individual’s ex-post
utility of an alternative x ∈ X is given by the ex-ante value of the prospect that yields x
with certainty, the Bernoulli hypothesis implies
Ui(x) = U
EA
i (x1m) = aiU
vNM
i (x) + bi
where ai ∈ R++ and bi ∈ R are the parameters of the aﬃne function ϕi. Thus, the
Bernoulli hypothesis implies that the ex-post utility function Ui is an increasing aﬃne
transformation of the vNM function UvNMi and, therefore, is a particular vNM function
itself. Equation (2) can therefore be written as
UEAi (x) = ai
m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
i
(
xj
)
+ bi =
m∑
j=1
pjUi
(
xj
)
. (3)
(3) shows that if the Bernoulli hypothesis is satisﬁed, the individual utility function Ui
plays two roles: it is an indicator of actual well-being and, in addition, it is a vNM function.
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Thus, the value of a prospect x ∈ X to i ∈ N according to UEAi is the expected utility of
x given the probabilities p and the ex-post utility function Ui.
As is the case for the individual expected-utility hypothesis, consistency with the
individual Bernoulli hypothesis is a domain restriction. The Bernoulli domain DB ⊆ UEA
is deﬁned as follows. For all UEA ∈ UEA, UEA ∈ DB if and only if there exists a proﬁle
U ∈ U such that, for all i ∈ N and for all x ∈ X,
UEAi (x) =
m∑
j=1
pjUi
(
xj
)
. (4)
Individual Bernoulli consistency can now be formulated by specifying the domain of the
ex-ante social-evaluation functional FEA.
Individual Bernoulli Consistency: DEA = DB.
In our multi-proﬁle setting, consistency with the individual Bernoulli hypothesis re-
quires the social-evaluation functional to produce a social ordering on a smaller domain
than consistency with the individual expected-utility hypothesis does. Consequently, con-
sistency with the individual Bernoulli hypothesis is a weaker requirement than consistency
with the individual expected-utility hypothesis. In contrast, the individual Bernoulli hy-
pothesis is the stronger assumption in the single-proﬁle case because each axiom merely
requires the single proﬁle to belong to the appropriate domain.
Following Harsanyi [1955, 1977], we assume that individual ex-ante utility functions
satisfy the Bernoulli hypothesis (the consequences of strengthening individual Bernoulli
consistency to individual expected-utility consistency are examined later). Social orderings
are assumed to satisfy the expected-utility hypothesis. This requires the existence of a
social vNM function such that the social ranking of two prospects is obtained by comparing
their social expected vNM values.
Social Expected-Utility Hypothesis: There exists a function U0:X ×DEA →R such
that, for all x,y ∈ X and for all UEA ∈ DEA,
xREAUEAy⇔
m∑
j=1
pjU0
(
xj , U
EA
) ≥ m∑
j=1
pjU0
(
yj , U
EA
)
.
The social vNM function U0 is allowed be proﬁle-dependent. In our multi-proﬁle setting,
if this function were not allowed to depend on UEA, an imposed social ranking would
result. In Harsanyi’s [1955] lottery framework, there is only a single proﬁle of ex-ante
utility functions and the second argument is not needed.
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3. The social aggregation theorem for prospects
We ﬁrst state a version of the welfarism theorem for ex-ante utilities. The ﬁrst part is a
straightforward reformulation of the standard welfarism theorem: on the Bernoulli domain,
ex-ante versions of Pareto indiﬀerence and binary independence of irrelevant alternatives
together are equivalent to the existence of an ex-ante social-evaluation ordering R on
Rn such that, for any ex-ante proﬁle in the domain of FEA and for any two prospects
x and y, the ranking of x and y according to REA
UEA
is determined by the ranking of the
associated ex-ante utility vectors according to R. The second part shows that comparisons
of prospects in which alternatives occur with certainty must be performed according to
the ex-ante social-evaluation ordering R as well.
The ex-ante versions of the welfarism axioms are deﬁned as follows.
Ex-Ante Pareto Indiﬀerence: For all x,y ∈ X and for all UEA ∈ DEA, if UEA(x) =
UEA(y), then xIEA
UEA
y.
Ex-Ante Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all x,y ∈ X and
for all UEA, U¯EA ∈ DEA, if UEA(x) = U¯EA(x) and UEA(y) = U¯EA(y), then
xREAUEAy ⇔ xREAU¯EAy.
We obtain the following result, the proof of which can be found in Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2002] (see also Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [2003], Mongin [1994] and
Mongin and d’Aspremont [1998]).
Theorem 1: If FEA satisﬁes individual Bernoulli consistency, ex-ante Pareto indiﬀer-
ence and ex-ante binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, then there exists a social-
evaluation ordering R on Rn such that, for all x,y ∈ X and for all UEA ∈ DB,
xREAUEAy⇔ UEA(x)RUnE(y) (5)
and, for all x, y ∈ X and for all U ∈ U ,
x1mR
EA
UEAy1m ⇔ U(x)RU(y)
where U is the proﬁle corresponding to UEA according to (4).
Now we show that any ex-ante social-evaluation functional satisfying the axioms of
Theorem 1 and the social expected-utility hypothesis must possess a property that is equiv-
alent to the requirement that R satisfy information invariance with respect to translation-
scale non-comparability.3
3 In Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002], a weaker version of this theorem that requires X to
contain at least four alternatives is proven. See Mongin [1994] and Mongin and d’Aspremont [1998] for
a similar theorem, establishing that the independence axiom of expected-utility theory is equivalent to
cardinal unit comparability formulated for an ex-ante social-evaluation ordering.
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Theorem 2: If FEA satisﬁes individual Bernoulli consistency, the social expected-utility
hypothesis, ex-ante Pareto indiﬀerence and ex-ante binary independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives, then, for all u, v, b ∈ Rn,
uRv ⇔ (u+ b)R(v + b) (6)
where R is the ex-ante social-evaluation ordering corresponding to FEA.
Proof. Let u, v, b ∈ Rn. By individual Bernoulli consistency, DEA = DB. The social
expected-utility hypothesis implies that there exists a function U0:X × DB → R such
that, for all x,y ∈ X and for all UEA ∈ DB,
xREAUEAy⇔
m∑
j=1
pjU0
(
xj , U
EA
) ≥ m∑
j=1
pjU0
(
yj , U
EA
)
.
Combined with (5), this yields
UEA(x)RUEA(y)⇔
m∑
j=1
pjU0
(
xj , U
EA
) ≥ m∑
j=1
pjU0
(
yj , U
EA
)
(7)
for all x,y ∈ X and for all UEA ∈ DB.
Because X contains at least three alternatives, we can choose x, y, z ∈ X and U ∈ U
so that
U(x) =
1
p1
u−
∑m
j=2 pj
p1
v + b,
U(y) = v + b
and
U(z) = v − p1∑m
j=2 pj
b.
Let x,y, z,w ∈ X be such that x(1) = z(1) = x, y(1) = w(1) = y, xj = yj = z for all
j ∈M \ {1} and zj = wj = y for all j ∈M \ {1}. By individual Bernoulli consistency, the
proﬁle UEA ∈ DB that corresponds to U satisﬁes
UEA(x) =
m∑
j=1
pjU
(
xj
)
= u,
UEA(y) =
m∑
j=1
pjU
(
yj
)
= v,
UEA(z) =
m∑
j=1
pjU
(
zj
)
= u+ b
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and
UEA(w) =
m∑
j=1
pjU
(
wj
)
= v + b.
Substituting into (7), we obtain
uRv ⇔ p1U0(x, UEA) +
m∑
j=2
pjU0(z, U
EA) ≥ p1U0(y, UEA) +
m∑
j=2
pjU0(z, U
EA)
⇔ p1U0(x, UEA) ≥ p1U0(y, UEA)
(8)
and, using (7) with x = z and y = w,
(u+ b)R(v + b)⇔ p1U0(x, UEA) +
m∑
j=2
pjU0(y, U
EA) ≥ p1U0(y, UEA) +
m∑
j=2
pjU0(y, U
EA)
⇔ p1U0(x, UEA) ≥ p1U0(y, UEA).
(9)
Because the second lines of (8) and (9) are identical, (6) follows.
The property of R established in Theorem 2 is identical to information invariance with
respect to translation-scale non-comparability deﬁned for the ex-ante social-evaluation or-
dering R. Therefore, we can apply a well-known result from the theory of social choice
under certainty to characterize utilitarianism in the present framework. To do so, we intro-
duce ex-ante versions of the axioms minimal increasingness and same-people anonymity.
Ex-ante minimal increasingness is implied by the ex-ante weak Pareto principle. Ex-
ante weak Pareto requires that if each person’s ex-ante utility is higher in prospect x than
in prospect y, then x is declared better than y. Ex-ante minimal increasingness requires
this conclusion to obtain only if the ex-ante utilities are equally distributed in both x and
in y. If a single utility level increases, utility inequality may increase and ex-ante minimal
increasingness permits a ranking in which the original situation is better.
Ex-Ante Minimal Increasingness: For all a, b ∈ R, for all x,y ∈ X and for all
UEA ∈ DEA, if UEA(x) = a1n  b1n = UEA(y), then xPEAUEAy.
Ex-ante same-people anonymity is an impartiality condition requiring that the iden-
tities of the individuals are irrelevant.
Ex-Ante Same-People Anonymity: For all UEA, U¯EA ∈ DEA, if there exists a bijec-
tion ρ:N → N such that UEAi = U¯EAρ(i) for all i ∈ N , then REAUEA = REAU¯EA .
A well-known result in social-choice theory states that the ex-post versions of weak
Pareto, same-people anonymity and translation-scale non-comparability characterize the
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utilitarian (ex-post) social-evaluation functional; see, for example, Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2002], Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [1984], Blackwell and Girshick
[1954], Bossert and Weymark [2003], d’Aspremont and Gevers [1977], Milnor [1954] and
Roberts [1980]. Though the above contributions state the result using weak Pareto instead
of minimal increasingness, it is clear from the proof employed in Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2002] that the result can be strengthened by employing the weaker axiom.
Translated into the uncertainty framework considered here, the axioms can be used to
characterize an ex-ante version of utilitarianism. We call the corresponding ex-ante social-
evaluation functional ex-ante utilitarianism and it is deﬁned as follows. For all x,y ∈ X
and for all UEA ∈ DEA,
xREAUEAy ⇔
n∑
i=1
UEAi (x) ≥
n∑
i=1
UEAi (y)
⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
n∑
i=1
Ui
(
xj
) ≥ m∑
j=1
pj
n∑
i=1
Ui
(
yj
)
where U is the proﬁle corresponding to UEA according to (4).
The proof of the following result is identical to the proof of Theorem 22 in Blackorby,
Bossert and Donaldson [2002, p. 586]. Though the result reported there assumes that X
contains at least four alternatives, the argument is the same given that Theorem 2 applies
to the case of three alternatives as well. We therefore do not provide a proof here. Mongin
[1994] proves a version of the theorem with a more structured universal set of alternatives.
Theorem 3: Suppose FEA satisﬁes individual Bernoulli consistency. FEA satisﬁes
the social expected-utility hypothesis, ex-ante Pareto indiﬀerence, ex-ante binary indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, ex-ante minimal increasingness and ex-ante same-people
anonymity if and only if FEA is ex-ante utilitarian.
Note that, if the ex-post utilities in any two alternatives diﬀer in a single state only,
they can be ranked with the sum of ex-ante utilities or with the sum of ex-post utilities in
that state. Thus, there is a utilitarian ex-post social-evaluation functional which applies
to each state. Consequently, the social-evaluation functional is both ex-ante and ex-post
welfarist. Note that ex-post welfarism is implied; it need not be assumed.
The characterization result of Theorem 3 requires the social-evaluation functional
to produce a social ordering only for proﬁles of ex-ante utilities satisfying the Bernoulli
hypothesis.4 An immediate question asks how the result is aﬀected by requiring consistency
with the individual expected-utility hypothesis instead. In contrast to the single-proﬁle
4 See Broome [1991] for arguments in favor of the individual Bernoulli hypothesis.
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setting, requiring consistency with the individual expected-utility hypothesis represents
a stronger condition on the ex-ante social-evaluation functional because it is required
to produce a social ordering on a larger domain. Thus, the scope of the other axioms
is widened. In that case, we obtain an impossibility result. Again, the proof of the
corresponding result in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002, Theorem 23] for universal
sets with at least four alternatives is easily adapted to the case where X may contain three
alternatives only. However, a more direct proof is available, and we present it here.
Theorem 4: There exists no ex-ante social-evaluation functional that satisﬁes individual
expected-utility consistency, the social expected-utility hypothesis, ex-ante Pareto indiﬀer-
ence, ex-ante binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, ex-ante minimal increasing-
ness and ex-ante same-people anonymity.
Proof. Suppose FEA satisﬁes the axioms in the theorem statement. Clearly, DB ⊆ DEU .
Theorem 3 implies that, for all x,y ∈ X and for all UEA ∈ DB,
xREAUEAy⇔ UEA(x)RUEA(y)
or, equivalently,
xREAUEAy ⇔
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
1
(
xj
)
, . . . ,
m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
n
(
xj
))
R
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
1
(
yj
)
, . . . ,
m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
n
(
yj
))
for some UvNM ∈ U , where R satisﬁes
uRv ⇔
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
n∑
i=1
vi (10)
for all u, v ∈ Rn.
Let ϕ:R → R be an increasing, surjective and non-aﬃne function, and deﬁne the
subset Dϕ of DEU as follows. For all UEA ∈ DEU , UEA ∈ Dϕ if and only if there exists a
proﬁle UvNM ∈ U such that, for all i ∈ N and for all x ∈ X,
UEAi (x) = ϕ
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
i
(
xj
))
. (11)
Now deﬁne the ordering Rϕ on Rn by
uRϕv ⇔ (ϕ(u1), . . . , ϕ(un))R(ϕ(v1), . . . , ϕ(vn)) (12)
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for all u, v ∈ Rn. Because ϕ is a bijection, its inverse ϕ−1 exists and (12) is equivalent to
uRv ⇔ (ϕ−1(u1), . . . , ϕ−1(un))Rϕ(ϕ−1(v1), . . . , ϕ−1(vn)) (13)
for all u, v ∈ Rn. Let UEA ∈ Dϕ. By deﬁnition, there exists a vNM proﬁle UvNM ∈ U
such that (11) is satisﬁed for all x ∈ X. Therefore, for any two prospects x,y ∈ X, it
follows that
UEA(x)RUEA(y)⇔
(
ϕ
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
1
(
xj
))
, . . . , ϕ
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
n
(
xj
)))
R
(
ϕ
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
1
(
yj
))
, . . . , ϕ
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
n
(
yj
)))
and, by (12),
UEA(x)RUEA(y)⇔
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
1
(
xj
)
, . . . ,
m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
n
(
xj
))
Rϕ
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
1
(
yj
)
, . . . ,
m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
n
(
yj
))
.
Letting U¯EAi (x) =
∑m
j=1 pjU
vNM
i
(
xj
)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all x ∈ X, this implies
U¯EA(x)RϕU¯EA(y)⇔
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
1
(
xj
)
, . . . ,
m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
n
(
xj
))
Rϕ
( m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
1
(
yj
)
, . . . ,
m∑
j=1
pjU
vNM
n
(
yj
))
.
Because, by deﬁnition, U¯EA ∈ DB, it follows that
U¯EA(x)RϕU¯EA(y)⇔ xREAU¯EAy.
Applying Theorem 3, we obtain
uRϕv ⇔
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
n∑
i=1
vi
for all u, v ∈ Rn. Together with (10) and (13), it follows that
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
n∑
i=1
vi ⇔
n∑
i=1
ϕ−1(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
ϕ−1(vi) (14)
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for all u, v ∈ Rn. (14) is equivalent to the existence of an increasing function H:R → R
such that
n∑
i=1
ϕ−1(ui) = H
( n∑
i=1
ui
)
(15)
for all u, v ∈ Rn. (15) is a Pexider equation and it follows that ϕ−1 must be aﬃne (see
Acze´l [1966, Chapter 3] for Pexider equations and their solutions). This implies that ϕ is
aﬃne as well, a contradiction.
The proof of Theorem 4 shows that, when the increasing transformations ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
are identical, prospects must be ranked according to their sums of expected utilities. This
means, however, that R must depend on the common transformation ϕ, contradicting
welfarism. A variant of Theorem 4 is obtained if anonymity is replaced by continuity.5
In a single-proﬁle setting, the impossibility is avoided because, with a single ex-
ante proﬁle, consistency with the individual expected-utility hypothesis is a weaker axiom
than consistency with the individual Bernoulli hypothesis and ex-ante social-evaluation
principles other than ex-ante utilitarianism become available. Blackorby, Donaldson and
Weymark [2003] prove that, in the single-proﬁle case, prospects must be ranked by their
respective transformed sums of individual ex-ante utilities if the individual expected-utility
hypothesis (but not necessarily the individual Bernoulli hypothesis) is satisﬁed. As in
our multi-proﬁle approach, utilitarianism obtains if the individual Bernoulli hypothesis is
satisﬁed.6 We believe that the multi-proﬁle framework employed here represents a suitable
way of formulating social-choice problems under uncertainty and we consider Theorems 3
and 4 to provide a strong argument in favour of utilitarianism.
One possible relaxation of the axioms in Harsanyi’s result (and our Theorem 3) is to
drop the social expected-utility hypothesis, a move that has been suggested by Diamond
[1967] and by Sen [1976, 1977, 1986]. They argue that ex-ante social-evaluation functionals
that satisfy the social expected-utility hypothesis cannot take account of the fairness of
procedures by which outcomes are generated (see also Weymark [1991]).
An interesting alternative, however, is to relax the ex-ante welfarism axioms. The
form of ex-ante welfarism of Theorem 1 is not applied to actual well-being, and this
suggests that ex-post welfarism may be more appropriate and ethically easier to defend
than ex-ante welfarism. Given individual Bernoulli consistency, ex-ante welfarism implies
ex-post welfarism but the converse implication is not true. A second way to relax the
assumptions of Theorem 3, therefore, is provided by requiring ex-post welfarism only.
5 See also Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [1999, 2003], Roemer [1996], Sen [1976] and Weymark
[1991].
6 A regularity condition is required in these single-proﬁle characterizations. This is not necessary in
our multi-proﬁle approach.
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Suppose, for example, that when the ex-post proﬁle is U ∈ U , such a principle
produces the ex-post ordering REPU of prospects, which is given by
xREPU y ⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
1
n2
n∑
i=1
(2i− 1)U(i)
(
xj
) ≥ m∑
j=1
pj
1
n2
n∑
i=1
(2i− 1)U(i)
(
yj
)
where, for all x ∈ X, (U(1)(x), . . . , U(n)(x)) is a permutation of (U1(x), . . . , Un(x)) such
that Uk(x) ≥ Uk+1(x) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. In this case, alternatives are ranked, ex
post, with a social-evaluation functional that expresses aversion to utility inequality. This
principle is not consistent with ex-ante Pareto indiﬀerence if individual ex-ante utilities
satisfy the Bernoulli hypothesis. This means that a prospect x may be regarded as better
than a prospect y although x and y are equally good for each person. With such a
principle, therefore, social rationality trumps individual rationality.
4. Ex-ante population principles for prospects
We now extend the ﬁxed-population model to cover situations where the population may
vary within and among prospects.7 In a variable-population framework, the universal set
X contains alternatives with diﬀerent sets (and numbers) of individuals alive. We use the
same notation as in the ﬁxed-population model for simplicity; to avoid ambiguities, we
rephrase all deﬁnitions in terms of the variable-population setting of this section.
There is a set M = {1, . . . , m} of m ≥ 2 possible states with ﬁxed positive proba-
bilities p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Rm++, where
∑m
j=1 pj = 1. As before, a prospect is a vector
x ∈ X where, for all j ∈ M , xj ∈ X is the alternative that occurs in state j. For x ∈ X,
the prospect x1m = (x, . . . , x) ∈ X is the prospect in which the alternative x occurs with
certainty.
In contrast to the ﬁxed-population case analyzed in the earlier sections, the compo-
sition and the size of the population may diﬀer from one alternative in X to another.
To keep track of the population associated with each alternative, we use a function
N:X → P(Z++), where P(Z++) is the set of all non-empty and ﬁnite subsets of Z++.
Thus, for an alternative x ∈ X, N(x) is the set of individuals alive in x. Furthermore,
we employ a function n:X → P(Z++) to denote the number of people alive in each alter-
native; that is, n(x) = |N(x)| for all x ∈ X. For a non-empty and ﬁnite set N ⊆ Z++,
XN ⊆ X is the set of all alternatives x ∈ X such that N(x) = N . Analogously to the
corresponding assumption in the ﬁxed-population setting, we assume that XN contains at
least three elements for all non-empty and ﬁnite N ⊆ Z++. For i ∈ Z++, we deﬁne
Xi = {x ∈ X | i ∈ N(x)},
7 A variable-population model of social choice under uncertainty in a lottery setting is discussed in
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1998].
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that is, Xi ⊆ X is the set of alternatives in which i is alive.
We introduce analogous deﬁnitions for prospects. Let N ⊆ Z++ be non-empty and
ﬁnite. XN is the set of all prospects where the individuals in N are alive in all states.
That is,
XN = {x ∈ X | N(xj) = N for all j ∈M}.
The functions NEA:X → P(Z++) and nEA:X → P(Z++) are deﬁned by
NEA(x) = ∪mj=1N
(
xj
)
and nEA(x) = |NEA(x)|
for all x ∈ X, that is, NEA(x) is the set of individuals alive in at least one state of prospect
x and nEA(x) is their number. Furthermore, let
Xθ = {x ∈ X | N
(
xj
)
= N
(
xk
)
for all j, k ∈M}.
The set Xθ is the set of complete prospects. In them, everyone who is alive in at least one
state is alive in all states. For x ∈ Xθ, we let Nθ(x) = N
(
xj
)
for some j ∈ M . Clearly,
by deﬁnition of Xθ, any state j ∈M can be used in this deﬁnition.
Consider an individual i ∈ Z++, and let
Xi = {x ∈ X | i ∈ N
(
xj
)
for all j ∈M}.
The set Xi contains all prospects such that i is alive in all states. Ui:Xi →R is i’s actual
or ex-post utility function. An ex-post utility proﬁle is an inﬁnite-dimensional vector
U = (Ui)i∈Z++ , and the set of all possible proﬁles is U . For an alternative x ∈ X, we
let U(x) = (Ui(x))i∈N(x). Individual ex-post utilities are interpreted as lifetime utilities
to avoid counter-intuitive recommendations regarding the termination of lives. We use
the standard normalization employed in the literature and identify a neutral life with a
lifetime-utility level of zero. A neutral life is a life that is as good as a life without any
experiences from the viewpoint of the individual leading it. Consequently, a fully informed,
self-interested and rational individual whose lifetime utility is below neutrality considers
her or his life to be worse than a life with no experiences.8
Individual i’s ex-ante utility function is UEAi :Xi → R. A proﬁle of ex-ante utility
functions is denoted by UEA = (UEAi )i∈Z++ , and the set of all logically possible ex-ante
proﬁles is UEA. For x ∈ X, we deﬁne UEA(x) = (UEAi (x))i∈NEA(x). Note that UEAi is
deﬁned on the domain Xi, that is, on the set of prospects in which i is alive in all states.
As is the case in a certainty framework, there is no reasonable interpretation of individual
utility values for situations in which the individual does not exist. Again, we assume that
8 See, for example, Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1997] and Broome [1993, 1999] for discussions
of neutrality and its normalization in population ethics.
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ex-ante utility and ex-post utility coincide in the presence of certainty. That is, for all
i ∈ Z++ and for all x ∈ Xi,
UEAi (x1m) = Ui(x).
As in the ﬁxed-population case, ex-post utility functions are determined by ex-ante utility
functions even though the ex-ante functions are not deﬁned for all prospects.
The set of all ex-ante orderings on X is denoted by OEA, and an ex-ante social-
evaluation functional is a mapping FEA:DEA → OEA with ∅ = DEA ⊆ UEA. FEA
assigns a social ordering on X to each admissible proﬁle of ex-ante utility functions. We
deﬁne REA
UEA
= FEA(UEA) for all UEA ∈ DEA, and we use PEA
UEA
and IEA
UEA
to denote the
asymmetric and symmetric factors of REA
UEA
.
The formulation of the Bernoulli hypothesis is easily extended to our variable-population
setting. The extended Bernoulli domain DB ⊆ UEA is deﬁned as follows. For all
UEA ∈ UEA, UEA ∈ DB if and only if there exists a proﬁle U ∈ U such that, for all
non-empty and ﬁnite N ⊆ Z++, for all i ∈ N and for all x ∈ XN ,
UEAi (x) =
m∑
j=1
pjUi
(
xj
)
. (16)
As in the certainty case, Ui is the ex-post utility function for person i. Extended individual
Bernoulli consistency is, again, expressed in the form of a domain restriction. Note that
restrictions are only imposed on complete prospects.
Extended Individual Bernoulli Consistency: DEA = DB.
The only change that is required in order to extend the social expected-utility hy-
pothesis to the variable-population setting is to require the existence of a social expected-
utility function that can be used to rank the prospects in XN for all non-empty and ﬁnite
N ⊆ Z++.
Extended Social Expected-Utility Hypothesis: For all non-empty and ﬁnite N ⊆
Z++, there exists a function UN0 :XN ×DEA →R such that, for all x,y ∈ XN and for all
UEA ∈ DEA,
xREAUEAy ⇔
m∑
j=1
pjU
N
0
(
xj , U
EA
) ≥ m∑
j=1
pjU
N
0
(
yj , U
EA
)
.
The variable-population versions of the welfarism axioms are deﬁned as follows.
Ex-Ante Pareto Indiﬀerence: For all non-empty and ﬁnite N ⊆ Z++, for all x,y ∈ XN
and for all UEA ∈ DEA, if UEA(x) = UEA(y), then xIEA
UEA
y.
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Ex-Ante Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all non-empty and
ﬁnite N ⊆ Z++, for all x,y ∈ XN and for all UEA, U¯EA ∈ DEA, if UEA(x) = U¯EA(x)
and UEA(y) = U¯EA(y), then
xREAUEAy ⇔ xREAU¯EAy.
Ex-ante minimal increasingness translates into the variable-population framework
analogously.
Ex-Ante Minimal Increasingness: For all non-empty and ﬁnite N ⊆ Z++, for all
a, b ∈ R, for all x,y ∈ XN and for all UEA ∈ DEA, if UEA(x) = a1n  b1n = UEA(y),
then xPEA
UEA
y.
We use the same names for the last three axioms as for their same-number counter-
parts because they merely require the corresponding same-number axiom to be satisﬁed
for every population. Finally, we deﬁne an extended version of ex-ante anonymity suitable
for our variable-population model.
Extended Ex-Ante Anonymity: For all x,y ∈ Xθ and for all UEA ∈ DEA, if there
exists a bijection ρ:Nθ(x) → Nθ(y) such that UEAi (x) = UEAρ(i)(y) for all i ∈ Nθ(x), then
xIEA
UEA
y.
If an ex-ante social-evaluation functional FEA satisﬁes extended individual Bernoulli
consistency, ex-ante Pareto indiﬀerence, ex-ante binary independence of irrelevant alter-
natives and extended ex-ante anonymity, then complete prospects are ranked by a single
anonymous ordering of vectors of ex-ante utilities. The result follows from the variable-
population version of the welfarism theorem without uncertainty and is omitted.9 An or-
dering Rn on Rn is anonymous if and only if, for all bijections ρ: {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}
and for all u, v ∈ Rn, if vi = uρ(i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then uInv. Furthermore, we
say that an ordering R on ∪n∈Z++Rn is anonymous if and only if its restriction to Rn is
anonymous for each n ∈ Z++.
Theorem 5: If FEA satisﬁes extended individual Bernoulli consistency, ex-ante Pareto
indiﬀerence, ex-ante binary independence of irrelevant alternatives and extended ex-ante
anonymity, then there exists an anonymous ordering RE on
⋃
n∈Z++ Rn such that, for all
x,y ∈ Xθ and for all UEA ∈ DB,
xREAUEAy⇔ UEA(x)REUEA(y).
9 See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1999] or Blackorby and Donaldson [1984].
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Theorems 3 and 5 together imply that the same-number sub-orderings of RE must be
utilitarian. We call any principle with this property a same-number utilitarian principle.
Theorem 6: If FEA satisﬁes extended individual Bernoulli consistency, the extended
social expected-utility hypothesis, ex-ante Pareto indiﬀerence, ex-ante binary independence
of irrelevant alternatives, ex-ante minimal increasingness and extended ex-ante anonymity,
then, for all non-empty and ﬁnite N ⊆ Z++, for all x,y ∈ XN and for all UEA ∈ DB,
xREAUEAy ⇔
∑
i∈N
UEA(x) ≥
∑
i∈N
UEA(y)
⇔
∑
i∈N
m∑
j=1
pjU
i(xj) ≥
∑
i∈N
m∑
j=1
pjU
i(yj)
⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N
U i(xj) ≥
m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N
U i(yj)
where U ∈ U is the proﬁle corresponding to UEA according to (16).
The ﬁxed-population characterization of Theorem 3 can now be extended to all
prospects in a variable-population setting by employing, in addition to the variable-
population versions of the axioms introduced above, the critical-level population principle,
which is the uncertainty analogue of Blackorby and Donaldson’s [1984] corresponding ax-
iom. It requires the existence of a ﬁxed critical level c ∈ R+ with the following property.
Consider two prospects x,y ∈ X and a proﬁle UEA ∈ DB, and suppose there is a person
k ∈ Z++ who is not alive in state j for some j ∈ M ; that is, k ∈ N
(
xj
)
. Now consider a
prospect x¯ ∈ X and a proﬁle U¯EA ∈ DB such that, in x¯, individual k is alive in state j
with utility level U¯k
(
x¯j
)
= c, other things the same. The critical-level population principle
requires that the ranking of x and y according to REA
UEA
is the same as the ranking of x¯
and y according to REA
U¯EA
. Note that the axiom applies to the extended Bernoulli domain
only—the individual ex-post utility functions Ui rather than the ex-ante utility functions
UEAi are referred to. We require the ﬁxed critical level to be non-negative so that additions
to utility-unaﬀected populations of individuals with negative utility levels are never ranked
as social improvements. We could impose this property separately but we incorporate it
into the critical-level axiom to simplify our exposition.
Critical-Level Population Principle: If DEA = DB, then there exists c ∈ R+ such
that, for all x,y, x¯ ∈ X, for all UEA, U¯EA ∈ DEA, for all j ∈ M and for all k ∈ Z++ \
N
(
xj
)
, if
U¯
(
y
)
= U
(
y
)
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for all  ∈M ,
N
(
x¯
)
= N
(
x
)
for all  ∈M \ {j},
U¯i
(
x¯
)
= Ui
(
x
)
for all  ∈M and for all i ∈ N(x),
N
(
x¯j
)
= N
(
xj
) ∪ {k}
and
U¯k
(
x¯j
)
= c,
then
xREAUEAy ⇔ x¯REAU¯EAy.
As an example, consider the two prospects which are outlined in Table 1. There are
two states. In prospect x, person 1 is alive in both states with ex-post utility levels 10 and
20, but person 2 is alive in state 1 only with a utility level of 12. Consequently, an ex-ante
utility level is not deﬁned for person 2.
Table 1
Prospect x Prospect x¯
State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2
Person 1 10 20 10 20
Person 2 12 12 c
The critical-level population principle asserts that there exists a non-negative utility level c
such that prospects x and x¯ are equally good. Prospect x¯ is complete and ex-ante utilities
are deﬁned for both individuals. c is independent of all other information and it can be
used to convert any prospect to a complete prospect that is equally good.
A variable-population extension of ex-ante utilitarianism is given by ex-ante critical-
level utilitarianism which is deﬁned as follows. There exists α ∈ R such that, for all
x,y ∈ X and for all UEA ∈ DEA,
xREAUEAy⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N(xj)
[
Ui
(
xj
)− α] ≥ m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N(yj)
[
Ui
(
yj
)− α] (17)
18
where U is the proﬁle corresponding to UE according to (16).
10 For complete prospects,
N(xj) = N(xk) = Nθ(x) for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . , m} and all x ∈ Xθ and, in that case, (17)
can be written as
xREAUEAy⇔
∑
i∈Nθ(x)
[( m∑
j=1
pjUi
(
xj
))− α] ≥ ∑
i∈Nθ(y)
[( m∑
j=1
pjUi
(
yj
))− α]
⇔
∑
i∈Nθ(x)
[
UEAi (x)− α
]
≥
∑
i∈Nθ(x)
[
UEAi (y)− α
] (18)
for all x,y ∈ Xθ. The entries on the second line of (18) are given by the critical-level-
utilitarian value function applied to ex-ante utilities.
We obtain the following characterization of ex-ante critical-level utilitarianism with
a non-negative critical level α.
Theorem 7: Suppose FEA satisﬁes extended individual Bernoulli consistency. FEA
satisﬁes the extended social expected-utility hypothesis, ex-ante Pareto indiﬀerence, ex-ante
binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, ex-ante minimal increasingness, extended
ex-ante anonymity and the critical-level population principle if and only if FEA is ex-ante
critical-level utilitarian with α ≥ 0.
Proof. That ex-ante critical-level utilitarianism with a non-negative critical level satisﬁes
the required axioms is straightforward to verify. Now suppose FEA satisﬁes the axioms.
By Theorem 6, for all non-empty and ﬁnite N ⊆ Z++, for all x,y ∈ XN and for all
UEA ∈ DB,
xREAUEAy ⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N
Ui
(
xj
) ≥ m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N
Ui
(
yj
)
(19)
where U ∈ U is the proﬁle corresponding to UEA according to (16). By the critical-level
population principle, there exists c ∈ R+ with the properties described in the axiom. Let
α = c and consider two prospects x,y ∈ X. Let x¯, y¯ ∈ X and U¯EA ∈ DB be such that
N
(
x¯j
)
= NEA(x) and N
(
y¯j
)
= NEA(y)
for all j ∈M ,
U¯i
(
x¯j
)
= Ui
(
xj
)
and U¯k
(
y¯j
)
= Uk
(
yj
)
for all j ∈M , for all i ∈ N(xj) and for all k ∈ N(yj),
U¯i
(
x¯j
)
= α and U¯k
(
y¯j
)
= α
10 See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995] and Blackorby and Donaldson [1984] for a discussion of
critical-level utilitarianism in the context of social evaluation under certainty.
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for all j ∈ M , for all i ∈ NEA(x) \N(xj) and for all k ∈ NEA(y) \N(yj). By repeated
application of the critical-level population principle,
xREAUEAy ⇔ x¯REAU¯EA y¯. (20)
Suppose that nEA(x¯) = nEA(y¯). By extended ex-ante anonymity, we can, without
loss of generality, assume that NEA(x¯) = NEA(y¯), and we denote this common set of
individuals by NEA. By (19), it follows that
x¯REAU¯EA y¯⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(xj)
Ui
(
xj
)
+
∑
i∈NEA\N(xj)
α
]
≥
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(yj)
Ui
(
yj
)
+
∑
i∈NEA\N(yj)
α
]
.
This inequality is equivalent to
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(xj)
Ui
(
xj
)
+
∑
i∈NEA
α−
∑
i∈N(xj)
α
]
≥
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(yj)
Ui
(
yj
)
+
∑
i∈NEA
α−
∑
i∈N(yj)
α
]
.
Simplifying, we obtain
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(xj)
Ui
(
xj
)− ∑
i∈N(xj)
α
]
≥
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(yj)
Ui
(
yj
)− ∑
i∈N(yj)
α
]
and, therefore,
x¯REAU¯EAy¯ ⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N(xj)
[
Ui
(
xj
)− α] ≥ m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N(yj)
[
Ui
(
yj
)− α].
Together with (20), this implies (17).
Now suppose nEA(x¯) = nEA(y¯). Without loss of generality, suppose nEA(x¯) <
nEA(y¯) and, by extended ex-ante anonymity, we can assume that NEA(x¯) ⊂ NEA(y¯) =
NEA(y). Let xˆ ∈ X and UˆEA ∈ DB be such that
Uˆ
(
y¯j
)
= U¯
(
y¯j
)
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for all j ∈M ,
N
(
xˆj
)
= NE(y)
for all j ∈M ,
Uˆi
(
xˆj
)
= U¯i
(
x¯j
)
for all j ∈M and for all i ∈ NEA(x¯) and
Uˆi
(
xˆj
)
= α
for all j ∈M and for all i ∈ NEA(y)\NEA(x¯). Again applying the critical-level population
principle repeatedly, we obtain
x¯REAU¯EAy¯ ⇔ xˆREAUˆEA y¯. (21)
By (19), it follows that
xˆREA
UˆEA
y¯⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(xj)
Ui
(
xj
)
+
∑
i∈NEA(x)\N(xj)
α +
∑
i∈NEA(y)\NEA(x)
α
]
≥
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(yj)
Ui
(
yj
)
+
∑
i∈NEA(y)\N(yj)
α
]
.
Rewriting, the inequality becomes
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(xj)
Ui
(
xj
)− ∑
i∈N(xj)
α +
∑
i∈NEA(y)
α
]
≥
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(yj)
Ui
(
yj
)− ∑
i∈N(yj)
α +
∑
i∈NEA(y)
α
]
which is equivalent to
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(xj)
Ui
(
xj
)− ∑
i∈N(xj)
α
]
≥
m∑
j=1
pj
[ ∑
i∈N(yj)
Ui
(
yj
)− ∑
i∈N(yj)
α
]
.
Therefore, we obtain
xˆREA
UˆEA
y¯⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N(xj)
[
Ui
(
xj
)− α] ≥ m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N(yj)
[
Ui
(
yj
)− α]
and, together with (20) and (21), this implies (17).
21
It is natural to ask what additional principles become available if the critical levels in
the critical-level population principle are allowed to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent utility vectors
and, therefore, population sizes. The following axiom is a weakening of the critical-level
population principle.
Critical-Level Consistency: IfDEA = DB, then there exists a function C:∪n∈Z++Rn →
R+ such that, for all x,y, x¯ ∈ X, for all UEA, U¯EA ∈ DEA, for all j ∈ M and for all
k ∈ Z++ \N
(
xj
)
, if
U¯
(
y()
)
= U
(
y()
)
for all  ∈M ,
N
(
x¯()
)
= N
(
x()
)
for all  ∈M \ {j},
U¯i
(
x¯()
)
= Ui
(
x()
)
for all  ∈M and for all i ∈ N(x()),
N
(
x¯j
)
= N
(
xj
) ∪ {k}
and
U¯k
(
x¯j
)
= C
(
U
(
xj
))
,
then
xREAUEAy ⇔ x¯REAU¯EAy.
Critical-level consistency asserts that, for each incomplete prospect, there is a com-
plete prospect which is equally good. The (ex-post) critical level used in the expansion
is, however, given by a function which can depend on the utilities of those alive (and
their number) in the state in question. As in the critical-level population principle, non-
negativity of the critical levels prevents the social-evaluation functional from ranking the
ceteris paribus addition of a person whose utility level is below neutrality as a social
improvement.
Replacing the critical-level population principle with the above axiom yields a charac-
terization of a subclass of an ex-ante version of the number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian
orderings.11 FEA is ex-ante number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian if and only if there
exists a function A:Z++ →R such that, for all x,y ∈ X and for all UEA ∈ DEA,
xREAUEAy ⇔
m∑
j=1
pj

 ∑
i∈N(xj)
Ui
(
xj
)− A(n(xj))


≥
m∑
j=1
pj

 ∑
i∈N(yj)
Ui
(
yj
)− A(n(yj))


11 See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2001] for a discussion of the certainty version of these principles.
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where U is the proﬁle corresponding to UEA according to (16). The function A can be
written as
A(n) =
n∑
k=1
ck−1
for all n ∈ Z++, where c0 ∈ R is arbitrary and ck is the ex-post critical level for population
size k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note that the ex-post critical levels can depend on population size
but not on utilities. We obtain
Theorem 8: Suppose FEA satisﬁes extended individual Bernoulli consistency. FEA
satisﬁes the extended social expected-utility hypothesis, ex-ante Pareto indiﬀerence, ex-ante
binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, ex-ante minimal increasingness, extended
ex-ante anonymity and critical-level consistency if and only if FEA is ex-ante number-
sensitive critical-level utilitarian with a non-decreasing function A.
Proof. That the ex-ante number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian ex-ante social-evaluation
functionals with a non-decreasing function A satisfy the required axioms is straightforward
to verify. Now suppose FEA satisﬁes the axioms. By critical-level consistency, there exists
a function C:∪n∈Z++Rn → R with the requisite properties. Let n ∈ Z++ be arbitrary
and consider four prospects x,y, x¯, y¯ ∈ Xθ and two proﬁles UEA, U¯EA ∈ DB such that
Nθ(x) = Nθ(y) = {1, . . . , n},
Ui
(
yj
)
=
m∑
k=1
pkUi
(
xk
)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all j ∈M ,
Nθ(x¯) = Nθ(y¯) = {1, . . . , n+ 1},
U¯i
(
x¯j
)
= Ui
(
xj
)
and U¯i
(
y¯j
)
= Ui
(
yj
)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all j ∈M , and
U¯n+1
(
x¯j
)
= C
(
U
(
xj
))
and U¯n+1
(
y¯j
)
= C
(
U
(
yj
))
for all j ∈M , where U, U¯ ∈ U are the proﬁles of ex-post utilities corresponding to UEA and
U¯EA. Using Theorem 6, it follows that xIEA
UEA
y. By repeated application of critical-level
consistency, this implies x¯IEA
U¯EA
y¯. Again using Theorem 6, it follows that
m∑
j=1
pjC
(
U
(
xj
))
= C
( m∑
j=1
pjU
(
xj
))
. (22)
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Because, for any m vectors u1, . . . , um ∈ Rn, a proﬁle U ∈ U with the above properties
can be chosen so that U
(
xj
)
= uj for all j ∈M , the function C must satisfy
m∑
j=1
pjC(u
j) = C

 m∑
j=1
pju
j

 (23)
for all u1, . . . , um ∈ Rn. By Theorem 3 and critical-level consistency,
C(uj) = C
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
uji1n
)
(24)
and
C

 m∑
j=1
pju
j

 = C



 m∑
j=1
pj
1
n
n∑
i=1
uji

 1n

 (25)
for all j ∈M and for all uj ∈ Rn. Fix n ∈ Z++ and deﬁne C¯n(τ) = C(τ1n) for all τ ∈ R.
Letting tj = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 u
j
i for all j ∈M , (23), (24) and (25) together imply
m∑
j=1
pjC¯
n(tj) = C¯
n

 m∑
j=1
pjtj

 (26)
for all t ∈ Rm. Letting zj = pjtj for all t ∈ Rm and for all j ∈M , this equation specializes
to
m∑
j=1
pjC¯
n(zj/pj) = C¯
n

 m∑
j=1
zj


for all z ∈ Rm. Deﬁning Cˆnj (zj) = pjC¯n(zj/pj) for all z ∈ Rm and for all j ∈ M , we
obtain
m∑
j=1
Cˆnj (zj) = C¯
n

 m∑
j=1
zj

 (27)
for all z ∈ Rm. This is a Pexider equation which has the solutions
Cˆnj (τ) = d
nτ + c¯nj (28)
and
C¯n(τ) = dnτ +
m∑
j=1
c¯nj (29)
for all τ ∈ R and for all j ∈ M , where dn ∈ R and c¯nj ∈ R for all j ∈ M . To establish
that there are no further solutions, we show that the Cˆnj (and, thus, C¯
n) must be bounded
below on a non-degenerate interval (see Acze´l [1966, p. 34 and p. 142]). Let j ∈ M and
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consider an arbitrary z ∈ Rm. Given z, let z¯ ∈ Rm be such that z¯k = zk for all k ∈M \{j}
and z¯j = z0 where z0 ∈ R is ﬁxed. Applying Theorem 3 and critical-level consistency, it
follows that
m∑
k=1
zk +
m∑
k=1
Cˆnk (zk) ≥
m∑
k=1
z¯k +
m∑
k=1
Cˆnk (z¯k) ⇔
m∑
k=1
zk ≥
m∑
k=1
z¯k. (30)
Substituting the deﬁnition of z¯ and rearranging, (30) implies that
Cˆnj (zj) ≥ Cˆnj (z0) + z0 − zj
for all zj ≥ z0. This implies that Cˆnj is bounded below on any interval [a, b] with z0 < a < b
and, therefore, the only solutions of (27) are given by (28) and (29). Using (24), (26) and
the deﬁnition of C¯n, substituting back yields
C(uj) = C
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
uji1n
)
= C¯n
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
uji
)
=
dn
n
n∑
i=1
uji + cn
for all j ∈ M and for all uj ∈ Rn, where cn =
∑m
j=1 c¯
n
j . By critical-level consistency,
critical levels must be non-negative and, because average utility can be arbitrarily high or
arbitrarily low for any given value of n, it follows that dn must be equal to zero for all
n ∈ Z++. Thus, there exists a sequence (cn)n∈Z++ such that the critical-level function C
is given by C(u) = cn for all n ∈ Z++ and for all u ∈ Rn. Because the range of C is R+, it
follows that cn ≥ 0 for all n ∈ Z++. Letting c0 ∈ R be arbitrary, setting A(n) =
∑n
i=1 ci−1
for all n ∈ Z++ and using the deﬁnition of critical levels as in the proof of Theorem 7, it
follows that FEA is ex-ante number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian. Because the cn are
non-negative for all n ∈ Z++, A is non-decreasing.
The proof of Theorem 8 can be illustrated by an example which is depicted in Table 2.
As in the previous example, there are two states. In prospects x and y, the population is
{1, . . . , n} and, in prospects x¯ and y¯, the population is {1, . . . , n+1}. uji is the utility level
of person i in state j and EUi =
∑2
j=1 pju
j
i is the expected utility of person i. Because
each person has the same expected utility in prospects x and y, they are equally good.
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Table 2
Prospect x Prospect y
State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2
Person 1 u11 u
2
1 EU1 EU1
...
...
...
...
...
Person n u1n u
2
n EUn EUn
Prospect x¯ Prospect y¯
State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2
Person 1 u11 u
2
1 EU1 EU1
...
...
...
...
...
Person n u1n u
2
n EUn EUn
Person n + 1 C(u11, . . . , u
1
n) C(u
2
1, . . . , u
2
n) C(EU1, . . . , EUn) C(EU1, . . . , EUn)
In prospects x¯ and y¯, the utilities of persons 1, . . . , n are the same as in prospects
x and y. In x¯ and y¯, the added person has a utility levels given by the critical-level
function whose existence is guaranteed by critical-level consistency. That axiom implies
that prospects x and x¯ are equally good and that prospects y and y¯ are equally good.
Because x and y are equally good, transitivity implies that x¯ and y¯ are equally good.
Because, by Theorem 6, the social-evaluation functional is same-number utilitarian, it
must therefore be true that expected utilities for person n + 1 are the same in prospects
x¯ and y¯. Thus,
C
(
EU1, . . . , EUn
)
= C

 2∑
j=1
pju
j
1, . . . ,
2∑
j=1
pju
j
2

 = 2∑
j=1
pjC
(
uj1, . . . , u
j
n
)
.
The solution of this functional equation (equation (22) in the proof) allows C to depend
on population size but not on utility levels. The non-negativity requirement for ex-post
critical levels plays an important role in this result.
The conclusion of Theorem 8 is quite remarkable. Critical levels are shown to be
independent of utilities (but may depend on population sizes) as a result of adding other
axioms—critical-level consistency by itself allows for utility-dependent critical levels.
Analogous to the ﬁxed-population case, there is a single variable-population ordering
which, when applied to ex-ante utilities, can be used to rank complete prospects and, when
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applied to ex-post utilities, can be used to rank prospects whenever they diﬀer in a single
state only.
5. Variable probability distributions and prospects
The theorems of Sections 3 and 4 can be extended so that combinations of lotteries and
prospects are ranked. To do this, we let P = {p ∈ Rm+ |
∑m
j=1 pj = 1} and deﬁne an
uncertain alternative (U-alternative) to be a compound vector consisting of a probability
vector p ∈ P and a prospect x ∈ X. That is, (p,x) ∈ P×X is a U-alternative in which xj
is realized with probability pj for all j ∈M . Because probabilities are allowed to be zero,
the case in which the number of states is U-alternative dependent is implicitly covered.
We ﬁrst turn to the ﬁxed-population case and, as in Section 2, let the population be
N = {1, . . . , n}. Individual ex-ante utility functions can depend on the probability vector
p. UUEAi :P × X → R is the individual ex-ante utility function for person i ∈ N and
UUEA is the set of all proﬁles of such functions. If the individual Bernoulli hypothesis is
satisﬁed,
UUEAi (p,x) =
m∑
j=1
pjUi(xj)
where Ui ∈ U is person i’s ex-post utility function. UUB is the set of all proﬁles of ex-ante
utility functions that satisfy the Bernoulli hypothesis.
An ex-ante social-evaluation functional is a mapping FUEA:DUEA → OUEA where
∅ = DUEA ⊆ P×UUEA is the domain and OUEA is the set of all orderings on P×X. We
write RUEA
UUEA
= FUEA(UUEA) and use PUEA
UUEA
and IUEA
UUEA
to denote the asymmetric and
symmetric factors of RUEA
UUEA
.
The ﬁxed-population axioms are straightforward generalizations of the ﬁxed-population
axioms of Section 2.
Uncertainty Individual Bernoulli Consistency: DUEA = P×DUB.
Uncertainty Social Expected-Utility Hypothesis: There exists a function U0:P ×
X ×DUEA →R such that, for all (p,x), (q,y) ∈ P×X and for all UUEA ∈ DUEA,
(p,x)RUEAUUEA(q,y)⇔
m∑
j=1
pjU0
(
xj , U
UEA
) ≥ m∑
j=1
qjU0
(
yj , U
UEA
)
.
Uncertainty Ex-Ante Pareto Indiﬀerence: For all (p,x), (q,y) ∈ P ×X and for all
UUEA ∈ DUEA, if UUEA(p,x) = UUEA(q,y), then (p,x)IUEA
UUEA
(q,y).
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Uncertainty Ex-Ante Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all
(p,x), (q,y) ∈ P×X and for all UUEA, U¯UEA ∈ DUEA, if UUEA(p,x) = U¯UEA(p,x) and
UUEA(q,y) = U¯UEA(q,y), then
(p,x)RUEAUUEA(q,y)⇔ (p,x)RUEAU¯UEA(q,y).
Uncertainty Ex-Ante Minimal Increasingness: For all a, b ∈ R, for all (p,x), (q,y) ∈
P × X and for all UUEA ∈ DUEA, if UUEA(p,x) = a1n  b1n = UUEA(q,y), then
(p,x)PUEA
UUEA
(q,y).
Uncertainty Ex-Ante Same-People Anonymity: For all UUEA, U¯UEA ∈ DUEA, if
there exists a bijection ρ:N → N such that UUEAi = U¯UEAρ(i) for all i ∈ N , then RUEAUUEA =
RUEA
U¯UEA
.
The following theorem generalizes Theorem 1.
Theorem 9: If FUEA satisﬁes uncertainty individual Bernoulli consistency, uncertainty
ex-ante Pareto indiﬀerence and uncertainty ex-ante binary independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives, then there exists a social-evaluation ordering RU on Rn such that, for all
(p,x), (q,y) ∈ P×X and for all UUEA ∈ DUB,
(p,x)RUEAUUEA(q,y)⇔ UUEA(p,x)RUUUEA(q,y). (31)
The social-evaluation functional FUEA is ex-ante utilitarian if and only if, for all
(p,x), (q,y) ∈ P×X and for all UUEA ∈ DUEA,
(p,x)RUEAUUEA(q,y)⇔
n∑
i=1
UUEAi (p,x) ≥
n∑
i=1
UUEAi (q,y)
⇔
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pjUi(xj) ≥
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
qjUi(yj)
⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
n∑
i=1
Ui(xj) ≥
m∑
j=1
qj
n∑
i=1
Ui(yj).
The following theorem is a consequence of Theorems 3 and 9.
Theorem 10: Suppose FUEA satisﬁes uncertainty individual Bernoulli consistency.
FUEA satisﬁes the uncertainty social expected-utility hypothesis, uncertainty ex-ante Pareto
indiﬀerence, uncertainty ex-ante binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, uncer-
tainty ex-ante minimal increasingness and uncertainty ex-ante same-people anonymity if
and only if FUEA is ex-ante utilitarian.
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Proof. If FUEA is ex-ante utilitarian, it is straightforward to show that all of the axioms
are satisﬁed. Now suppose that FUEA satisﬁes the axioms of the theorem statement. By
Theorem 9, there exists an ordering RU on Rn such that (31) is satisﬁed. Because RU
is independent of probabilities, it can be found by examining the restriction of RUEA
UUEA
to
{p¯} ×X where p¯ ∈ P ∩Rm++. Theorem 3 implies that, for all u, v ∈ Rn,
uRUv ⇔
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
n∑
i=1
vi
and, as a consequence, FUEA is ex-ante utilitarian.
Although notational complexities have persuaded us not to include a formal demon-
stration, the results of Theorems 7 and 8 can be extended to cover all U-alternatives. To
do so, the axioms presented in Section 4 must be extended to the variable-population en-
vironment of U-alternatives. In addition, it is a simple matter to rewrite the critical-level
population principle and critical-level consistency in a similar way. We call the result-
ing axioms the uncertainty critical-level population principle and uncertainty critical-level
consistency.
Using the argument in the proof of Theorem 10, it is immediate that all complete
U-alternatives (in which each person is alive in all states or in none) with the same number
of people must be ranked with ex-ante utilitarianism.
Given the extended axioms and the uncertainty critical-level population principle, the
uncertainty ex-ante critical-level utilitarian principles with a non-negative critical level are
characterized. That is, there exists α ≥ 0 such that, for all (p,x), (q,y) ∈ P×X and for
all UUEA ∈ DUEA,
(p,x)REAUUEA(q,y)⇔
m∑
j=1
pj
∑
i∈N(xj)
[
Ui
(
xj
)− α] ≥ m∑
j=1
qj
∑
i∈N(yj)
[
Ui
(
yj
)− α]. (32)
If uncertainty critical-level consistency is used instead of the uncertainty critical-level
population principle, the argument in the proof of Theorem 8 establishes that ex-post
critical levels are utility-independent but may depend on the number of people alive. We
therefore obtain a characterization of uncertainty ex-ante number-sensitive critical-level
utilitarianism with a non-decreasing function A. That is, there exists a non-decreasing
function A:Z++ → R such that, for all (p,x), (q,y) ∈ P×X and for all UUEA ∈ DUEA,
(p,x)RUEAUUEA(q,y)⇔
m∑
j=1
pj

 ∑
i∈N(xj)
Ui
(
xj
)− A(n(xj))


≥
m∑
j=1
qj

 ∑
i∈N(yj)
Ui
(
yj
)− A(n(yj))

 .
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As in Section 4, the function A can be written as
A(n) =
n∑
k=1
ck−1
for all n ∈ Z++, where c0 ∈ R is arbitrary and ck is the ex-post critical level for population
size k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A simple example illustrates the application of the ﬁrst of these classes of social-
evaluation functionals. Suppose that, in the year 2100, astronomers discover that an
asteroid is on a collision course with Earth and will obliterate life on the planet if nothing
is done (alternative x). If, however, resources are committed to a very costly international
program, the asteroid might be diverted and the planet saved. The probability of success
(alternative y) is 1/2. If the program fails, alternative z is realized. Population sizes and
average utilities are given in Table 3.
Table 3
Population size Average utility
x 10 billion 50
y 20 billion 40
z 10 billion 35
If nothing is done (x), 10 billion people live with an average utility level of 50. If the
asteroid is diverted (y), the number of people who ever live is doubled and their average
utility is 40; average well-being is lower because of the resources used to divert the asteroid.
If the attempt to divert the asteroid fails (z), 10 billion people live with an average utility
of 35; average utility is still lower because of the sacriﬁce of the initial population.
The possibilities can be expressed by means of the two U-alternatives ((1, 0), (x, x))
and ((1/2, 1/2), (y, z)). According to (32), taking action is better than doing nothing if
and only if
1
2
[
20(40− α)]+ 1
2
[
10(35− α)] > 10(50− α),
which obtains if and only if α < 15.
6. Concluding remarks
Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem is one of the most fundamental results in social-
choice theory. Its original formulation and most of the subsequent literature are phrased
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in terms of variable lotteries and a single utility proﬁle. The absence of a multi-proﬁle
framework necessitates some regularity assumptions and, as a consequence, the result lacks,
to some extent, transparency. Moreover, the anonymity axioms of standard social-choice
theory cannot be applied in the single-utility-proﬁle setting. Our formulation in terms of
prospects in a multi-proﬁle setting allows us to proceed without regularity assumptions
(not even continuity is required if anonymity is assumed) and ﬁts naturally with the
standard multi-proﬁle social-choice framework.
The proof technique in the ﬁxed-population case is novel: we prove a variant of
Harsanyi’s theorem by showing that translation-scale non-comparability is implied, which
permits us to involve a classical result on utilitarian social-evaluation functionals under
certainty. This diﬀers substantially from the methods employed in the lottery setting.
The variable-population model represents a substantial generalization of the ﬁxed-
population case. Although the ﬁxed-population results are used in our characterizations,
there is a considerable amount of additional complexity. By using an axiom—critical-level
consistency—that associates an equally-good complete prospect with every incomplete one,
we are able to reduce the plethora of ethically acceptable social-evaluation functions to a
single class, the ex-ante number-sensitive utilitarian functionals. The ex-ante critical-level
utilitarian subclass results if the stronger critical-level population principle is employed.
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